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News | Focus
  Offshore Exploration 
in the Arctic
Can Shell’s Oil-Spill Response 
Plans Keep Up?
Shell must cease drilling well before the water 
freezes over lest a late-season blowout cause oil 
to accumulate under the ice through the winter.
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A
ll around the world, oil and gas companies are being 
forced by resource declines to drill in less accessible 
areas, and the Arctic is their newest frontier. The 
geology above the Arctic Circle—that is, everything 
above latitude 66.56°N—holds an estimated 90 billion 
barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, or 22% of the 
world’s undiscovered
1 conventional resources, according to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration.
2 It’s thought that these resources lie 
predominantly under Arctic seas, which have recently become easier to 
reach due to significant reductions in seasonal ice cover associated with global climate change.
3 Norway, Russia, 
Canada, Denmark, and other northern countries are in various stages of developing offshore Arctic programs, 
and diplomatic squabbles have broken out over territorial rights extending all the way to the North Pole.
Between 1980 and 2000 Alaska accounted for an average one-fifth of U.S. oil production.
4 
But  with  oil  flowing  through  the  Trans-Alaska  Pipeline  falling  by  more  than  two-thirds 
since  a  peak  in  1988,
4  the  recent  pressure  to  drill  in  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  (OCS) 
off the state’s north coast has been relentless. Alaska derives at least 90% of its revenues from oil,
5 so 
law  makers  in  that  state—supported  by  much  of  the  state’s  population—have  pushed  hard 
for offshore authorization. The federal government has also indicated its support, in 2011 expressing a
A second drill rig engaged in 
Beaufort Sea exploration—the 
Kulluk—could begin drilling a relief 
well in the Chukchi within a week 
should attempts to kill a worst-case 
blowout fail.
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commitment to facilitate development in the 
OCS region and to expedite offshore permitting 
in Alaska, assuming that “safety, health, and 
environmental standards are fully met.”
6
Now the United States has taken a big step 
toward opening the seas off Alaska to a new 
round of oil and gas exploration. In a major 
breakthrough for the petroleum industry and 
loss for drilling opponents, the U.S. Department 
of the Interior (DOI) in February 2012 approved 
Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc.’s oil-spill response plan 
for the Chukchi Sea, which provides habitat for 
polar bears, walruses, and other wildlife, and a 
hunting ground for Alaska Natives who still go 
whaling in seal-skin boats.
7 Six weeks later the 
company’s spill-response plan for the adjoining 
Beaufort Sea also was approved.8 
Shell Alaska spokesman Curtis Smith says 
DOI approval of the plans puts the company 
on track to launch exploration in the region 
this summer (final permits to drill must still 
be obtained). But many critics contend it’s not 
possible to drill safely in the region, given the 
isolation and harsh weather, and they question 
how well the plans will protect Arctic health in 
the event of a spill. 
Native Health Concerns
Access to the Alaska OCS has been blocked 
in recent years mainly by lawyers representing 
Alaska Natives, who argue that apart from its 
ecological consequences, offshore drilling could 
hurt the traditional livelihoods, health, and 
well-being of these local residents. The Inupiat 
people have hunted bowhead whales and other 
marine species in Arctic waters for well over 
2,000 years, and half their caloric intake comes 
from subsistence sources of meat.
9 Health 
studies of the native population have associated 
the oil industry’s expansion in the North Slope 
to disruption of the traditional subsistence 
lifestyle, contributing to rising rates of type 2 
diabetes, metabolic problems from changing 
diets, substance abuse, suicide, and asthma.
9
Meanwhile, during fall migration bowhead 
whales have been documented to travel up 
to 18 miles to avoid sounds they don’t like,
10 
potentially putting them beyond safe reach of 
a hunt that is crucial to the Inupiat’s cultural 
identity. “For every additional mile a whaler 
has to travel, there’s more potential for injury or 
a potentially catastrophic event,” says Thomas 
Lohman, an environmental resource specialist 
in the North Slope Borough11 Department of 
Wildlife Management. 
The 2011 exploration season was blocked 
in part by Alaska Native health concerns hav-
ing to do with Shell’s air permits sought from 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).
12 In that case, lawyers argued success-
fully that ships in the offshore drilling fleet—
particularly icebreakers—would emit excessive 
amounts of nitrogen oxides, respiratory irritants 
linked with heart disease. (That issue has been 
resolved by Shell and the EPA, and final air 
permits for the Kulluk and Noble Discoverer 
rigs were issued in October 2011 and February 
2012, respectively.
13,14) According to Smith, 
Shell will deploy best-available pollution-control 
technology on its drill rigs, and all its aircraft in 
the region will use ultra-low-sulfur diesel fuel, 
which substantially cuts emissions of nitrogen 
oxides and particulate matter.15 
Lohman concedes that Shell has worked 
hard and spent a lot of money to address local 
concerns. “There’s more of a partnership and 
dialogue now with the company than there 
used to be,” he says. “But what comes up again 
and again when you talk to local communities 
is the oil-spill scenario. People worry what will 
happen to their food supply if things really get 
out of control.” 
Exploring the OCS
Scientists believe the geology underlying the 
Chukchi and Beaufort seas contains a short-
term energy bonanza: 23.6 billion barrels of 
oil and 104.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 
according to recent government estimates.
16 (By 
comparison, the United States will consume an 
estimated 7.3 billion barrels of oil in 2012.
17) 
Exploration involves drilling just a few wells 
to confirm that the predicted size and dimen-
sions of the resource—estimated with seismic 
technology—are correct. Shell’s current plans 
for the Chukchi Sea are to drill up to six wells 
over the next two years in what’s known as the 
Burger Prospect, about 70 miles offshore in 
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roughly 140 feet of water. The company also 
plans to drill four wells over two years in the 
Beaufort Sea at a shallower depth, pending fur-
ther DOI review. 
Unlike development and production (the 
year-round process of constructing the neces-
sary facilities and extracting oil and gas for 
delivery to market), exploration will happen 
only in summer, when the seas are mostly ice-
free.
18 Shell’s oil-spill response plans were devel-
oped specifically for conditions expected from 
July 15 to the end of October, but the vessels 
and equipment are designed to work past this 
period if needed, with contingencies for pro-
longed cleanup through late fall, Smith says. 
With more than $4 billion invested in off-
shore Arctic infrastructure, research, and leases,
19 
Shell has been seeking approval for OCS explo-
ration every summer since 2006. But given that 
northern seas offer some of the most challenging 
drilling conditions on Earth
20 in an area that’s 
also home to an array of vulnerable and iconic 
species of wildlife, the company’s plans have 
drawn heavy scrutiny from federal agencies and 
a wide range of passionate stakeholders. Drilling 
opponents and some oil-spill veterans assert that 
the extreme cold, storms, high waves, winds, 
darkness, and fog that occur routinely in the 
region could challenge spill cleanup, particu-
larly in the event of a late-fall blowout, when ice 
begins to gather.
21 What’s more, OCS waters are 
exceedingly remote—roads, airports, port facili-
ties, housing, and other infrastructure needed to 
support a large-scale spill response are few and 
far between.
16
Smith responds that Shell’s oil-spill response 
plans are the most far-reaching developed by the 
company yet for any of its global operations. As 
required by the DOI in the wake of the 2010 BP 
Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mex-
ico, the plans describes worst-case discharges of 
25,000 barrels of oil per day in the Chukchi
7 
and 16,000 barrels per day in the Beaufort.
8 
These figures, which Smith says reflect the likely 
pressures and other characteristics of the respec-
tive reservoirs, are considered more realistic than 
the 5,500 barrels per day that was considered 
in earlier plans. Also in response the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster, the DOI requires that Shell 
have access to a “capping stack” to stanch subsea 
oil flows in the event that other shutoff systems 
fail (the BP blowout was eventually contained 
by such a device) in addition to capabilities to 
capture and collect oil from the capping stack, 
and ready access to a rig that could kill a blow-
out by drilling a relief well. 
Differences from Deepwater 
Horizon
Multiple factors play in Shell’s favor in the 
OCS, says Peter Velez, Shell’s global emergency 
response manager. For instance, unlike BP’s ill-
fated Macondo Prospect, site of the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout, which occurred 5,000 feet 
underwater, Shell’s proposed sites off Alaska 
are in less than 150 feet of water, making them 
more accessible to divers and remotely operated 
vehicles deployed during spill response, he says. 
Moreover, well pressures at the proposed sites 
aren’t expected to exceed 3,000–4,000 psi, 
compared with the Macondo well’s pressure of 
almost 15,000 psi, making a blowout less likely 
to occur, Velez says. 
All  the  same,  to  avoid  the  risk  of  a 
late-season blowout, the DOI’s Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management (BOEM)
22 required that 
Shell cease drilling into known hydrocarbon 
zones in the Chukchi Sea by September 24, 
just over a month before ice is expected to begin 
covering the proposed sites.
23 (Drilling in the 
Beaufort Sea, according to the BOEM, must 
also be suspended by August 25 to avoid inter-
fering with whale hunts by the Nuiqsut and 
Kaktovik people but may resume after the hunt-
ers have reached their quota.
24) Commenting on 
the Chukchi plan upon its approval, James A. 
Watson, director of the DOI Bureau of Safety 
and Environmental Enforcement, said, “After 
an exhaustive review, we have confidence that 
Shell’s plan includes the necessary equipment 
and personnel prestaging, training, logistics, 
and communication to act quickly and mount 
an effective response should a spill occur.”
25
If Shell’s summer exploration confirms 
that the oil resource is economically viable, 
then not just Shell but also other companies 
will begin planning in earnest for year-round 
development, suggesting that at some point 
in the future the OCS may be populated by 
numerous drill rigs operating simultaneously. 
Shell’s plans describe spill responses under 
“varying ice conditions,” but importantly, they 
don’t address the near-total ice cover antici-
pated during midwinter development, which 
Smith says is at least a decade away.
How to address oil accumulating under 
completely frozen seas—a nightmare scenario, 
many scientists say—remains somewhat of an 
open question. “My concern is that year-round 
development will require adequate capacity to 
respond to spills in icy, dark conditions. And 
so far, I haven’t seen a demonstration of that 
capacity anywhere,” says Roger Rufe, a retired 
vice admiral in the U.S. Coast Guard, who 
served as district commander in Alaska from 
1992 to 1995. Commenting on spill cleanup 
during midwinter, Smith responds, “We’re 
looking at this now, but we haven’t made any 
fixed decisions about what we’re going to do. 
What I can say is that whatever plan we pro-
duce will be completely transparent, and it will 
undergo the same scrutiny as the response plan 
for summer exploration that we have now.”
During the Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
thousands of response workers and hundreds 
of air- and seacraft were deployed from the 
Gulf’s highly developed coastline. Moreover, 
the response was coordinated by a consortium 
of oil companies, each contributing resources 
and manpower to the cleanup effort. But 
in the Alaskan OCS, Shell has to rely on its 
own, much more limited resources, which 
in the Chukchi include the drill rig itself 
(the Noble Discoverer, making its way to the 
OCS from New Zealand at press time), an 
oil-spill response vessel (the Nanuq, which 
carries smaller workboats, booms, storage for 
recovered oil, and a dispersant system), a pair 
of large barges that carry oil skimmers and 
storage capacity for recovered oil, an Arctic 
storage tanker (the Affinity, with 513,000 bar-
rels of storage space, to be positioned within 
240 nautical miles of the Noble Discoverer), and 
an assortment of shoreline protection equip-
ment, landing craft, and other work boats. 
A second drill rig engaged in Beaufort Sea 
exploration—the Kulluk—could begin drill-
ing a relief well in the Chukchi within a week 
should attempts to kill a worst-case blowout 
fail, Velez says. 
Blowout Prevention
Blowouts start with what’s known as a kick, or 
a blast of pressurized oil and gas that suddenly 
bursts up the wellbore and into the drill pipe. 
A five-story blowout preventer (BOP) built over 
the wellhead should activate “blind shear rams” 
that cut the drill pipe, seal the well bore, and 
kill the well.
7,8 
But that doesn’t always happen: in the 
Gulf of Mexico BP fatefully relied on a BOP 
with just one blind shear ram, which failed 
to engage, leaving nothing to stop a full-scale 
blowout on 20 April 2010. Eleven workers lost 
their lives when the rig exploded, and the rogue 
well released 4.9 billion barrels (205.8 million 
gallons) of oil into the sea before it was killed 
nearly three months later.
26 For backup in the 
Arctic, Shell’s BOP will have not one but two 
blind shear rams, and if they fail, the 100-ton 
capping stack ideally will land on the dysfunc-
tional BOP and either seal the well completely 
or divert the gushing oil to a container ship.
7,8 
As of this writing, Shell’s Arctic capping 
stack is still under construction; the company 
plans to test it in the Pacific Ocean off Seattle, 
much to the dismay of environmental activ-
ists who say it should be tested in the Arctic 
OCS. “Testing in Washington could answer a 
few logistical questions about how it would be 
deployed,” says Layla Hughes, an attorney and 
senior program officer with the World Wildlife 
Fund’s Arctic team in Juneau. “But it doesn’t 
give a sense of the real-world limitations of using 
the capping stack in the Arctic in bad weather.”
Shell claims its oil-spill response will kick 
into gear within an hour of a blowout. The 
company divides its worst-case scenario into 
icy and non-icy conditions, which is important 
because ice cover dictates how and whether the 
company can deploy booms and skimmers for 
so-called mechanical oil-spill recovery. Focus  | Offshore Exploration in the Arctic
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Booms float on the surface and act as 
barriers to prevent oil from spreading. They 
can also be used to gather oil into thick 
U-shaped pools, so it can be burned on the 
surface (“in-situ burning”) or pulled out of 
the water by skimmers for storage. Shell plans 
to use fire-resistant booms and two types of 
skimmers: weir skimmers, which suck oil and 
water off the surface like a vacuum cleaner 
(the oil is separated later), and brush skim-
mers, which spin in the water and trap oil on 
rotating fibers. 
Booms don’t work when sea-surface ice 
cover exceeds 30%, claims Stein Erik Sørstrøm, 
research manager with SINTEF (Stiftelsen for 
Industriell og Teknisk Forskning, or Founda-
tion for Scientific and Industrial Research), an 
independent research organization based in 
Trondheim, Norway. But he also points out 
that, at a high enough percentage of cover, 
ice can itself act as a sort of boom. (Sørstrøm 
directed SINTEF’s Joint Industry Project Oil 
in Ice program, a collaboration of six multi-
national oil companies, including Shell, that 
investigated oil-spill response scenarios in the 
laboratory and then in Arctic seas halfway 
between Norway and the North Pole.)
27
According to SINTEF’s research find-
ings, booms and skimmers work best in calm, 
ice-free conditions. But at wind speeds over 
22 knots, oil starts sloshing over the booms, 
while ice buildup clogs skimmers 
and reduces their efficiency.
7 Shell’s 
Chukchi plan asserts that from July 
to September, wind speeds average 
10–13 knots in a prevailing northeast 
direction that carries oil away from 
shore.
7
In-Situ Burning
When heavy weather gets in the way of 
mechanical recovery, Shell’s plans shift 
chiefly to nonmechanical methods: 
namely, in-situ burning and the use 
of chemical dispersants. Both of these 
methods are contingent on approval 
from the Coast Guard, which by fed-
eral law is in charge of the response 
(although it does not actually perform 
the cleanup). 
Under optimal conditions, in-situ 
burning can remove 85–95% of the 
oil, but that depends on a number 
of factors.
28 In particular, the oil 
needs to be fresh, meaning that 
its combustible volatile fractions 
haven’t yet been lost to evaporation. 
Oil weathers over time, leaving less 
combustible fractions behind. It also 
mixes with water, making it less able 
to ignite—oily emulsifications won’t 
burn if they contain more than 25% 
water.
29 High winds can also make it 
difficult for crews to ignite floating 
oil. A 2011 report by the Ottawa, Ontario–
based firm S.L. Ross Environmental Research, 
Ltd., which consults to both industry and 
the Canadian government, claims that in-situ 
burning isn’t possible in open water with waves 
higher than 1.5 meters or at wind speeds of 
more than 20 knots,
29 conditions that occur 
routinely in the OCS.
On the other hand, cold Arctic tempera-
tures limit evaporation, and this slows weath-
ering, according to Sørstrøm. And although 
it’s not expected during summer, ice cover-
age of up to 80% also favors in-situ burning, 
because it dampens waves and concentrates oil 
into dense floating pockets. At higher cover-
age, ice blocks access to the oil, but Shell has 
contingencies for that: its plans call for “ice 
management,” or using ships to hold the ice 
at bay or break it into smaller pieces. When 
ice coverage becomes so extensive that cleanup 
isn’t no longer possible, the plans call for halt-
ing the response until spring.   
“We’ve done experiments showing that oil 
encapsulated in ice will remain [unweathered] 
through the winter,” says Steve Potter, vice 
president and director of S.L. Ross. “So when 
the ice melts, the oil will appear on the surface, 
and you can deal with it then.” 
Shell’s plans claim that oil encapsulated in 
ice won’t come in contact with wildlife. But 
Richard Steiner, a conservation biologist with 
Anchorage consulting service Oasis Earth, 
counters that there’s a lot of microbial life in 
the interface where floating ice meets the sea, 
and that this layer also is the site of a great deal 
of “primary production,” or the conversion 
of aquatic carbon dioxide into life-sustaining 
organic molecules. Moreover, the floating sheet 
of ice that makes up the sea surface will travel, 
he says, and spread the oil when it melts.
Chemical Dispersants
Chemical dispersants make up the third leg 
of Shell’s spill response plans. Shell intends 
to rely mainly on a product used during the 
Deepwater Horizon response: Corexit® 9500. 
This combination of petroleum distillates, sur-
factants, and stabilizers allows oil to mix more 
easily into water, where it can be degraded by 
marine bacteria. During the Deepwater Hori-
zon blowout, BP applied Corexit directly at the 
gushing wellhead on the seafloor; Shell intends 
to apply it mostly from the air, specifically 
from a Lockheed C-130 Hercules military 
plane or from a vessel.
7,8 But chemical dis-
persants aren’t preapproved for use in Alaska 
and would be considered only when other 
response measures aren’t working, according to 
the Alaska Regional Response Team, which is 
charged with developing contingency plans to 
coordinate multiagency disaster responses.
30
Meanwhile, Ken Trudel, a senior envi-
ronmental scientist with S.L. Ross, 
says investigators don’t have much 
information about how dispersants 
might work under real-world Arctic 
conditions. SINTEF conducted the 
first significant field tests, showing 
that Corexit applied from floating 
vessels onto both fresh and week-old 
oil achieved dispersing efficiencies 
of greater than 90% (aerial spraying 
wasn’t evaluated).
31 But targeting oil 
between ice floes was challenging, 
that study found. “When you’ve got 
oil on open water, all you have to do 
is spray it,” Trudel says. “But when 
the oil’s between ice floes, you have to 
find it, spray the dispersant right on 
to the oil, and then it’s harder to find 
out if it’s working because you can’t 
see it as well.” 
According to Trudel, dispersants 
work best on fresh oil in choppy seas 
that mix the chemicals into the water. 
Shell plans to create turbulence with 
its vessels’ propellers if the seas are icy 
or flat, and to use dispersants only 
until several days after the blowout is 
contained.
Both dispersant use and in-situ 
burning  have  ecological  conse-
quences. Some studies suggest that 
chemically dispersed oil can be more 
toxic to marine life than undispersed 
An  Inupiaq  hunter  uses  an  oar  to  listen  for  passing 
whales  in  the  Chukchi  Sea.  Environmental  resource 
specialist  Thomas  Lohman  acknowledges  that  Shell 
has worked hard to address local concerns, but adds, 
“What comes up again and again when you talk to local 
communities  is  the  oil-spill  scenario.  People  worry 
what will happen to their food supply if things really 
get out of control.”Focus  | Offshore Exploration in the Arctic
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oil,
32 although this remains an open area of 
research. And according to a November 2010 
report commissioned by the Pew Environment 
Group’s U.S. Arctic program, charred residues 
left over from in-situ burning aren’t as toxic as 
the original oil, but they’re hardly benign.
32 
Shell’s plans call for manually removing as 
much of this residue as possible
7,8—a laborious 
process involving strainers, nets, sorbents, and 
skimmers—but whatever sinks to the bottom 
can contaminate benthic ecosystems.
32
Although Shell’s plans describe detailed 
contingencies for cleanup in ice, Smith empha-
sizes that summer exploration will occur in 
open water and nearly perpetual daylight. Dur-
ing this time, the main limiting factors will be 
wind, waves, and fog (which reduces visibility 
for aerial dispersant application), each of which 
becomes increasingly problematic as the season 
progresses.
30 
Weather conditions in the Beaufort Sea 
could make it impossible to mount any oil-spill 
response whatsoever 22% of the time in July, 
41% of the time in August, and 56% of the 
time in September.
29 That increase over time 
results mainly from daylight losses that become 
more pronounced as fall draws near—daylight 
starts to lessen in September, and darkness 
rules the region from November through 
mid-February.
7 Potter says aerial dispersant 
application isn’t advisable in darkness. “You 
could spray at night, but you would probably 
waste a lot of dispersant,” he explains. “With-
out visual sighting from small planes and com-
munication with the application aircraft, it’s 
hard to target the slick.” (He adds that this 
logistical problem “seems solvable, technically, 
and is an area of ongoing research.”)
Ready for Prime Time?
The question remains, however, whether these 
or any other oil-spill response plans will fulfill 
their purpose when the time comes. A report 
issued by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) as this article went to press notes 
that, although the oil industry has improved its 
capability to respond to subsea blowouts in the 
Gulf of Mexico, these improvements may not 
be enough to overcome all the environmen-
tal and logistical challenges associated with 
drilling in the Arctic. Moreover, the report 
indicates that although the DOI has instituted 
more rigorous requirements for companies’ 
oil-spill response plans since the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster, the department has not docu-
mented a consistent procedure for evaluating 
these plans and ensuring that companies can 
actually carry them out.
33
The GAO report echoed a 2011 report 
commissioned by DOI Secretary Kenneth 
Salazar to assess the state of the science on 
offshore Arctic drilling, which revealed 
significant unknowns about how oil and 
gas activities might affect local ecology. 
That report also raised major questions 
about whether oil companies could respond 
adequately to a major spill in the region.
34 
As Shell finally moves toward summer 
exploration, its work in the OCS is expected 
to attract tremendous public attention. In Feb-
ruary 2012 the Noble Discoverer drill rig was 
boarded by protesters in New Zealand, nota-
bly by actress Lucy Lawless (who, ironically, 
appeared as a gas station attendant in a Shell 
commercial 20 years ago
35). And in March, 
Greenpeace activists in Finland raided two 
Shell icebreakers bound for the Chukchi Sea. 
Smith expects that protesters will try to raid 
Shell’s ships in the OCS this summer. 
But it’s highly improbable that Shell will 
spill any oil, at least in significant amounts, 
this year. Drilling just a few wells under mainly 
sunny skies and in more or less ice-free seas 
doesn’t constitute the real threat to the Alas-
kan OCS. Exploration merely sets the stage for 
the much greater threat that comes later, at the 
point of development. Shell’s plan may have 
satisfied the DOI’s requirements for a limited 
venture this summer. But questions about how 
the oil industry will protect this fragile ecosys-
tem and the people who live there if develop-
ment begins full-tilt remain unanswered. 
Charles W. Schmidt, MS, an award-winning science writer from 
Portland, ME, has written for Discover Magazine, Science, and 
Nature Medicine. 
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